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ABSTRACT
An important policy discussion on joining the banking union is currently taking place in
Denmark and Sweden. In this article we review the pros and cons of joining. The main
rationale for joining the banking union is the importance of cross-border banking in the
EU internal market. Reviewing the banking systems, we find that banks in Denmark and
Sweden have the same cross-border characteristics as those in the euro area countries,
suggesting a similar rationale for joining the banking union. Moreover, both countries have
large banks which may be too big to save at country level, but not at the banking union
level. Nevertheless, there are some governance concerns. While euro area countries have
an automatic and full say in all banking union arrangements, the non-euro area countries
(the ‘out’ countries) lack certain formal powers in ultimate decision-making; however, we
find that this may be less of a problem in practice. If necessary, the ‘out’ countries would
have the ‘nuclear option’ of leaving the banking union.
KEY WORDS: cross-border banking; banking union; non-euro area countries; banking
supervision; financial stability
I. INTRODUCTION
The euro crisis was the immediate motivation for the establishment of the banking
union in Europe in 2012. The more structural reason behind the banking union is the
creation of the internal market in banking, which facilitates cross-border banking. That
raises the question whether countries that are outside the euro zone (the so-called ‘out’
countries) but that participate in the EU internal market should also join the banking
union. With Brexit, this question has gained renewed interest for the remaining ‘out’
countries with large banks, such as Denmark and Sweden.
The ‘out’ countries have the option of joining the banking union, and in this article
we consider whether Denmark and Sweden should join. The assessment is made from
the perspective of a country that is a member of the EU but which has not yet adopted
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the euro as its currency. Essentially, the focus of this article is on whether it would
be beneficial for Denmark and Sweden to join the banking union. It forms part of an
emerging literature on the pros and cons of joining the banking union.1
In this article, we consider the degree of cross-border banking in Denmark and Swe-
den. It appears that banks in both countries have the same cross-border characteristics
as in the euro area countries, which suggests that the rationale for joining the banking
union would be similar for Denmark and Sweden and for the euro area countries. But
there are some governance concerns. While euro area countries have an automatic and
full say in all banking union arrangements, the ‘out’ countries lack certain formal powers
in ultimate decision-making. This may in practice be less of a problem than in theory,
as the governing council of the European Central Bank (ECB) tends to rubberstamp
decisions from the supervisory board, of which the ‘out’ countries are full members.
Moreover, the ‘out’ countries would have the ‘nuclear option’ of leaving the banking
union.
II. CROSS-BORDER BANKING
The perceived need for a banking union in Europe has been widely motivated by the
negative spiral that can result when banks hold sovereign bonds and governments bail
out banks. This close link between banks and government solvency has, since the euro
sovereign debt crisis, been seen as one of the biggest threats to financial stability in
Europe. Therefore, creating a supranational supervisor and bank resolution regime
seemed a logical response to this threat.
However, the academic literature has for a long time, and long before the euro
sovereign debt crisis, pointed to the need for a banking union when there is cross-
border banking.2 With cross-border banking, there is a ‘financial trilemma’ stating that
the three objectives of financial stability, cross-border banking, and national financial
policy cannot be achieved at the same time.3 More generally, the interests of home and
host countries of cross-border banks are likely to deviate in distressed situations.
The key point can be illustrated as follows. Suppose country A is not only the home
country of banks from country A but also the host country of banks from country
B. In order to provide financial stability in country A, the authorities in country A
need information (about capital and liquidity positions of distressed banks) from the
1 Zsolt Darvas and Guntram Wolff, ‘Should non-euro area countries join the single supervisory mechanism?’
Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/06; Pia Hüttl and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘Should the “outs” join the European
banking union?’ Bruegel Policy Contribution 2016/03; Thorsten Beck, ‘Better in or better out: Weighing
Sweden’s options vis-à-vis the banking union’ Committee on Potential Participation in the European Banking
Union (Fi 2019); Karolina Ekholm, ‘Pros and cons of taking part in the banking union’ (2020) Nordic
Economic Policy Review 229; Svend E. Hougaard Jensen, ‘Comment on Karolina Ekholm “Pros and cons
of taking part in the banking union”’ [2020] Nordic Economic Policy Review 260.
2 Early papers include David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber, ‘The European Central Bank: A bank or a
monetary policy rule’ NEBR Working Paper No 4016 (1992); Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘Banking supervision
and lender of last resort in EMU’ in Mads Adenas, Laurence Gormley and Ian Harden (eds), European
Economic and Monetary Union: The Institutional Framework (Kluwer 1997); Xavier Vives, ‘Restructuring
financial regulation in the European Monetary Union’ (2001) 19 Journal of Financial Services Research 57.
3 Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘The Financial Trilemma’ (2011) 111 Economics Letters 57.
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Table 1. Cross-border penetration of European banking
Number
of banks
Total assets
ine billion
Percentage of total assets
Home
country
Other EU
countries
Third
countries
Banking union 5516 30,836 84% 13% 3%
Non-banking union 1752 12,786 56% 19% 25%
European Union 7268 43,622 76% 14% 10%
United States 5643 12,360 84% 16%
Source: Jakob de Haan, Dirk Schoenmaker and Peter Wierts, Financial Markets and Institutions: A European Perspective (4th
edn, CUP 2020).
Note: Total assets include banking assets in the home country, other EU countries, and third countries. Data as at end of
2018.
supervisory authorities of country B. However, country B may have reasons to hold
back such information. Failure to get this information from the foreign supervisor, fully
and on time, might (seriously) jeopardize the ability of the authorities in country A to
deliver financial stability in country A. So, there is a need for a supranational authority.
Against this background, the pros and cons of taking part in the banking union
should be assessed in terms of the magnitude of cross-border banking. While it is widely
agreed that a currency union does not work without a banking union, the question is
whether the total banking assets of EU countries outside the euro area include a large
component from other EU countries.
Table 1 seeks to illuminate this. Apparently, the foreign component of total banking
assets is significantly larger in the EU countries outside the euro area (non-banking
union) than in the countries within the euro area. From this perspective, the case for
joining the banking union is strong. The question is whether Denmark and Sweden are
well represented by the average numbers for the non-banking union countries.
Table 2 offers a closer look at individual EU countries outside the euro area. Two
observations leap to the eye. First, the magnitude of cross-border banking penetration
in Denmark and Sweden is much lower than in non-banking union EU countries in
Eastern Europe. Specifically, the ‘home’ share of total banking assets in Denmark and
Sweden is 86 and 82 per cent, respectively.
Second, the pattern found for Denmark and Sweden does not deviate much from
what is found for members of the euro area (see Table 1). Therefore, the degree of cross-
border penetration of Scandinavian banking is likely to be high enough to constitute a
(strong) case for joining the banking union. Yet, in future work, it would be interesting
to study more closely whether there is a critical level of cross-border banking such that
if a country’s cross-border banking exceeds a certain ‘threshold’ (eg 15 per cent), the
country would benefit from joining the banking union.
III. CONSOLIDATED BANKING SUPERVISION AND BURDEN SHARING
Another aspect of joining the banking union is the effectiveness of national banking
supervision. It is difficult for national home-based supervisors to monitor the foreign
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Table 2. Cross-border banking penetration in non-euro area EU countries
Total assets
ine billion
Percentage of total assets
Home
country
Other EU
countries
Third
countries
Bulgaria 59 24% 72% 4%
Czech Republic 312 16% 84% 0%
Croatia 59 17% 82% 1%
Denmark 1174 86% 14% 0%
Hungary 128 54% 41% 6%
Poland 484 56% 41% 4%
Romania 105 37% 63% 0%
Sweden 1296 82% 17% 1%
Non-euro area (without UK) 3617 70% 29% 1%
United Kingdom 9169 51% 15% 34%
Non-euro area (with UK) 12,786 56% 19% 25%
Source: Jakob de Haan, Dirk Schoenmaker and Peter Wierts, Financial Markets and Institutions: A European Perspective (4th
edn, CUP 2020).
Note: Total assets includes banking assets in the home country, other EU countries, and third countries. Data as at end of
2018.
operations of large banks. National supervisors typically rely on supervisory colleges of
home and host supervisors based on memoranda of understanding (MoUs). However,
these MoUs are voluntary.
Moreover, supervisors lack incentives to cooperate and share information in times
of crisis,4 as witnessed in the global financial crisis. A major achievement of the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is the consolidated supervision of cross-border banks
at the euro area level.5 Consolidated supervision in banking union enables the ECB, as
central supervisor, to have an overall view of a bank’s euro area operations.
Table 3 shows the cross-border operations of the major banks (with total assets
of more than e100 billion) in the banking union countries as well as Denmark and
Sweden.6 For illustration purposes, we have based our calculations on the assumption
that Denmark and Sweden have joined the banking union, which we label the enlarged
banking union. The geographic spread of the major banks’ activities is divided between
the home country, the rest of the enlarged banking union, the rest of Europe, and the
rest of the world.
The total banking assets of major banks in the banking union are located as follows:
62 per cent in the home country, 12 per cent in the enlarged banking union, 11 per cent
in the rest of Europe, and 15 per cent in the rest of the world. The geographic spread
of the major Danish and Swedish banks does not deviate much from that of the major
4 Schoenmaker (n 3).
5 Dirk Schoenmaker and Nicolas Véron, ‘European Banking Supervision: The First Eighteen Months’ Bruegel
Blueprint 2016/25.
6 Patty Duijm and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘European Banks Straddling Borders: Risky or Rewarding?’ Finance
Research Letters (forthcoming).
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Table 3. Geographic segmentation of major banks
Bank Total
assets ine
billion
Percentage of total assets
Home
country
Enlarged
banking
union
Other EU
countries
Other
world
countries
BNP Paribas 1960 34% 38% 7% 22%
Crédit Agricole 1763 81% 9% 2% 8%
Deutsche Bank 1475 31% 18% 8% 43%
Banco Santander 1444 27% 5% 38% 30%
Société Générale 1275 73% 7% 11% 10%
BPCE 1260 91% 1% 1% 7%
ING 846 29% 39% 16% 17%
UniCredit 837 43% 37% 17% 3%
Intesa Sanpaolo 797 84% 5% 7% 4%
Crédit Mutuel 794 90% 5% 3% 2%
BBVA 690 49% 2% 1% 48%
Rabobank 603 73% 5% 2% 21%
DZ Boank 506 85% 8% 2% 5%
Kf W 472 81% 0% 11% 8%
Commerzbank 452 53% 3% 30% 14%
ABN AMRO 393 73% 14% 3% 11%
CaixaBank 383 81% 10% 5% 5%
KBC 292 55% 10% 30% 4%
LBBW 238 72% 11% 8% 9%
La Banque Postale 231 99% 0% 1% 0%
Banco de Sabadell 221 74% 0% 17% 9%
Erste Group 221 44% 9% 46% 1%
Bayerische Landesbank 215 82% 7% 6% 6%
Bankia 214 91% 0% 8% 0%
Belfius 168 72% 11% 14% 2%
NORD/LB 165 86% 7% 2% 5%
Banco Popolare 161 95% 0% 3% 1%
Landesbank Heleba 158 78% 0% 13% 9%
NRW Bank 148 80% 0% 20% 0%
BNG Bank 140 83% 0% 17% 0%
Monte dei Paschi di Siena 139 95% 4% 1% 1%
OP Financial Group 137 86% 7% 5% 2%
Raiffeisen Zentralbank 135 20% 17% 50% 12%
UBI Banca 127 95% 0% 3% 2%
Bank of Ireland 123 70% 0% 30% 0%
SNS Reaal 111 98% 0% 2% 0%
(Continued)
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Table 3. Continued.
Bank Total
assets in
e billion
Percentage of total assets
Home
country
Enlarged
banking
union
Other EU
countries
Other
world
countries
Total Banking Union 19,296 62% 12% 11% 15%
Nordea Bank 582 29% 51% 19% 1%
Svenska Handelsbanken 282 59% 15% 22% 4%
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 260 67% 23% 6% 4%
Swedbank 225 81% 13% 4% 2%
Total Sweden (with Nordea) 1349 51% 32% 15% 2%
Total Sweden (without
Nordea)
767 68% 17% 11% 3%
Danske Bank 475 55% 27% 17% 0%
Nykredit Holding 192 95% 2% 3% 0%
Realkredit Denmark 118 98% 1% 1% 0%
Total Denmark 785 71% 17% 11% 0%
Source: Patty Duijm and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘Data on cross-border exposures of 61 largest European banks’ (2020) 30
Data in Brief 1.
Note: Major banks are defined as banks with total assets of more than e100 billion. Total assets are divided over the
home country, other enlarged banking union (BU) countries, other EU countries, and the rest of the world (‘other world
countries’). The enlarged banking union includes the banking union countries, Denmark, and Sweden. Data as at end of
2017.
European banks. The proportion within the enlarged banking union is even larger for
both countries (17 per cent) than for the banking union countries (12 per cent). For
the two Scandinavian countries, the case for joining the banking union on this front is
even stronger than that of the existing banking union countries.
Furthermore, the banking union allows countries to share the burden of resolving
ailing banks.7 The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) resolves ailing banks at the
banking union level with access to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). The reformed
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Treaty provides a backstop facility to the SRF,8
which constitutes burden sharing between ESM countries.
If Denmark and Sweden join the banking union, they will not also join the ESM
unless they become a member of the euro zone at the same time. Under the common
backstop arrangement for the SRF, they would set up a ‘parallel credit line’. They would
participate in the common backstop on equivalent terms and thus join the burden
sharing mechanism.9
By contrast, outside the banking union Denmark and Sweden will be on their own
if and when they have to resolve one of their major banks. The stability of a banking
7 Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises’ (2009) 5
International Journal of Central Banking 141.
8 Article 18A of the draft revised text of the treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism as agreed by
the Eurogroup on 14 June 2019.
9 Article 13 of the draft guideline on the backstop facility to the SRB for the SRF.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jfr/article/6/2/317/5880726 by Erasm
us U
niversity R
otterdam
 user on 03 D
ecem
ber 2020
Should Denmark and Sweden Join the Banking Union? • 323
Table 4. Potential fiscal costs for selected countries (as a percentage of GDP)
Countries Assets in
$ billion
Recapitalization
in $ billion
Fiscal costs
as % of GDP
Top 3 banks China 8991 405 3.7%
Top 3 banks US 6287 283 1.6%
Top 3 banks Japan 6023 271 6.6%
Top 3 banks euro area 5785 260 2.3%
Top 3 banks UK 5288 238 8.4%
Top 3 banks Switzerland 1989 90 13.5%
Top 3 banks Sweden (incl. Nordea) 1349 61 10.5%
Top 3 banks Sweden (excl. Nordea) 920 41 7.2%
Top 3 banks Denmark 942 42 12.1%
Source: Expanded from Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘Resolution of International Banks: Can Smaller Countries Cope?’ (2018) 21
International Finance 39.
Notes: The largest three home country banks (those headquartered in the home country) are chosen for each jurisdiction.
Based on bank rescues during the global financial crisis, recapitalization cost is standardized at 4.5 per cent of total assets.
The fiscal costs represent the potential fiscal costs of recapitalizing the largest three banks as percentage of GDP. Data as
at 2015 and for Sweden and Denmark 2017.
system ultimately depends on the strength and credibility of the fiscal backstop. While
large countries can still afford to resolve large banks on their own, small and medium-
sized countries have difficulties providing a credible fiscal backstop to any large cross-
border banks they host.
Table 4 shows that the potential fiscal costs of a severe systemic crisis could amount
to 12.1 per cent of Danish GDP and 10.5 per cent of Swedish GDP, if the respective
government needed to recapitalize the largest three banks. We calculated an indicative
hurdle rate for fiscal costs of 8 per cent of GDP.10 Below that rate, countries were
able to resolve a financial crisis without external assistance during the global financial
crisis. Above that hurdle rate, countries needed external support from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) or the ESM.
So, Denmark and Sweden cannot provide a credible fiscal backstop to their large
banks. These countries have to manage this large and undiversified risk. In the case of
an asymmetric shock to the Danish or Swedish economy (eg a national housing market
shock), these economies are highly exposed to their large banks. The Swedish govern-
ment has introduced tax increases and extra regulation for its large banks. Moreover,
for the sake of its investors, its largest bank, Nordea, wanted to be in a peer group of
European banks instead of Swedish banks. Apparently, these pressures are behind the
recent relocation of Nordea from Sweden to Finland.11 Also the United Kingdom and
Switzerland, with potential fiscal costs above the hurdle rate of 8 per cent of GDP, have
adopted policies aimed at downsizing their banking system. We suggest that Denmark
should consider how it would deal with a banking system that is too big to save.
10 Dirk Schoenmaker, ‘Resolution of International Banks: Can Smaller Countries Cope?’ (2018) 21 Interna-
tional Finance 39.
11 Richard Milne, ‘Nordea to move its headquarters to Finland’ Financial Times (London, 6 September 2017).
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Summing up, the level of inward banking from other banking union countries and
the level of outward banking to other banking union countries determine the benefits of
joining banking union. The calculation of these benefits is very important for assessing
what Ekholm12 reports as the clearest cost of joining the banking union: the loss of
regulatory and supervisory independence. However, the size of that cost may be small in
a world where financial markets are highly integrated.13 With a sufficiently high degree
of financial interdependence, the scope for regulatory and supervisory independence at
the national level may cease to exist.14
A move to banking union is a structural choice for cross-border banking. Banking
policies are then set and executed at the European level. This has both economic and
political consequences. Governments will face European Central Bank scrutiny if they
try to use their banks for national directed lending. There will also be less scope for
national banking policies.
IV. MONETARY UNION, MONETARY POLICY, AND DECISION-MAKING
The banking union was introduced in 2012 to address the bank-sovereign ‘doom loop’.
The rationale for centralized supervision in this case arises partly because of cross-
border externalities from sovereign default that are sufficiently large to justify cross-
border transfers. Whereas the euro can be at stake for members of the euro area, for
small stand-alone countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, the risks associated with a
doom loop may be much smaller. In principle, their central banks are not constrained
in the same way to act as lenders of last resort to the government as is ECB vis-à-vis the
governments in the euro area.
This insight might weaken the case for Danish and Swedish membership of the
banking union, as there is no currency union for them to defend and their access to
lender-of-last-resort activities seems more straightforward. However, there is a sub-
stantive difference between the exchange rate policy of the two countries, potentially
implying a (big) difference in the pro-versus-con calculation. While Sweden pursues
inflation targeting, Denmark pegs the krone to the euro, as part of ERM-2. The peg is
a cornerstone of Danish economic policy and there is widespread support for the fixed
exchange rate policy.15 It implies that monetary policy interest rates are solely used to
keep the Danish krone stable against the euro, while other considerations are not taken
into account. Therefore, stability of the euro area is more important for Denmark than
for Sweden.
This takes us to discuss the role of decision-making in the banking union.16 The
point is that the location of the supervisory authority in the banking union is ultimately
12 Ekholm (n 1).
13 Ekholm (n 1).
14 Schoenmaker (n 3).
15 Michael Bergman, Michael Hutchison and Svend E. Hougaard Jensen, ‘Shaping the fiscal policy framework:
Lessons from fiscal consolidations in Denmark and Sweden’ in Torben Andersen, Michael Bergman and
Svend E. Hougaard Jensen (eds), Reform Capacity and Macroeconomic Performance in the Nordic Countries
(OUP 2015).
16 For an excellent overview see Nicolas Véron, ‘Europe’s Radical Banking Union’, Bruegel Essay and Lecture
Series 2015.
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in the ECB. This may well present a challenge, as Denmark and Sweden have no
representation on the ECB’s governing council, which is the ultimate decision-making
body on supervisory decisions. Nevertheless, the countries that join the banking union
on a voluntary basis will be represented at the ECB’s supervisory board, which prepares
the supervisory decisions.17 In that way, Denmark and Sweden would de facto be part
of decision-making, as the governing council typically rubberstamps supervisory board
decisions.18 Clearly, Denmark and Sweden would prefer the SSM to be located outside
the ECB, but this is hardly realistic at this stage of development of the banking union.
Also, as monetary policy and macroprudential polices are intertwined, it can from a
broader point of view be debated whether a separate location for the SSM is desirable.
Again, a difference between Denmark and Sweden can be pointed out.19 In practice,
Denmark has two decades of experience with taking part in such an arrangement, by
being de facto in the euro area when it comes to monetary policy but without having
a representation in the governing council. Apparently, membership of the decision-
making bodies has not proven to be decisive with regard to reaping benefits in terms of
macroeconomic stability. In the same vein, participation in the banking union, without
joining the euro area, could be a combination likely to generate important benefits in
terms of financial stability.
Another example where it could make a difference if a country is a member of not
only the banking union but also the euro area is resolution. Suppose Denmark joins the
banking union and a Danish bank—eg Danske Bank—runs into big trouble. In the first
round, decisions about resolution would be taken by the SRM, a body where Denmark
has representation.20
Resolution might happen in a situation where resources would need to come from
the ESM, the fiscal backstop for the SRF. The ESM is an intergovernmental institution
of the euro area countries. Nevertheless, as discussed above, there are commitments
in the draft revised ESM Treaty and the draft backstop guidelines, which ensure that
countries joining banking union without joining the ESM will be informed and involved
equivalently in the decision-making for the backstop arrangements.21
Thus, ultimately, in this scenario the decision about resolution of Danske Bank might
have been taken by a body without direct Danish representation. Admittedly, this might
be regarded as a rather extreme case, but it illustrates the importance—for Denmark
17 See Arts 2, 7, and 26 of Council Regulation (EU) 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific
tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions, [2013] OJ L287/63 (the SSM Regulation). It is interesting to note that currently one of the four
ECB representatives on the supervisory board is from Sweden, namely Kerstin af Jochnik who was earlier
vice-governor of Sveriges Riksbank.
18 Schoenmaker and Véron (n 5).
19 Michael Bergman, Svend Hougaard Jensen and Øystein Thøgersen, ‘Fiscal policy in the Scandinavian
countries’ in Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics
(Routledge 2018).
20 See Art 4 and 43 of Regulation (EU) 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July
2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and
amending Reg (EU) 1093/2010, [2014] OJ L225/1.
21 Article 18A(10) of the draft revised text of the treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism.
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and Sweden—of knowing in advance whether their treatment would be the same as for
members of the euro area.
V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The main rationale for joining the banking union is the importance of cross-border
banking in the EU internal market. Reviewing the banking systems, we find that banks
in Denmark and Sweden have the same cross-border characteristics as those in the euro
area countries, which suggests that they will have a similar rationale for joining the
banking union.
There is an (often neglected) area where we find the case for joining the banking
union particularly strong: the SSM. Indeed, the SSM already has significant resources
and will over time gain extensive experience in supervising different types of institu-
tions.22 The fact that it is located far from most of the institutions that it supervises may
also reduce the risk of regulatory capture.
The SSM, based in the ECB, is not only able to attract talent at the junior level
but is also able to develop and retain senior staff, thereby having a very experienced
and highly competent staff. Financial supervisory authorities in smaller countries, such
as Denmark and Sweden, typically have high turnover rates, with the best and most
ambitious staff moving to the private financial sector. The point is that supervision is
complex, and makes heavy demands on skills in order to match the expertise available
in commercial banks. To us, this is a key benefit of joining the banking union.
Overall, we consider that the clearest economic benefit of enlarging the banking
union is the prospect of more efficient resolution of cross-border banks at the banking
union level.23 An equal distribution of the gains as well as full participation in decision-
making are crucial for a lasting membership. Maybe a ‘flexible’ membership should be
considered, which would allow countries to join now and exit later without major costs
if membership does not live up to expectations.24
22 Beck (n 1).
23 See also Ekholm (n 1).
24 Art 7(6) of the SSM Regulation allows non-euro countries that join the banking union on a voluntary basis
also to terminate their ‘close cooperation’.
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